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COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Recommendations Of Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Being Assessed

Adoption Of Two Proposals Made

* * *

The Department of Defense has begun adopting recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report and top Defense officials say they expect a majority of the suggestions will be implemented.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird gave a clear picture of the Defense Department's position regarding the 237-page report July 29 when he appeared before about 1,000 people at the Youth Seminar program in Washington, D.C.

Asked if he anticipated the adoption of the majority of the 113 numbered proposals, and if their adoption would then result in Defense budget reductions, the Secretary of Defense replied:

"First, I would assume that a majority of the recommendations probably would be adopted. I don't want to fix my feet in concrete (and say) that every recommendation which is made by a panel making a critical report of our department will be adopted.



Secretary Laird
... reviews report

Officials Forecast Future Savings

* * *

"But I certainly can assume that the majority of those recommendations that I have gone over in this report will certainly be implemented in the Department of Defense."

Explaining further, Secretary Laird said the report makes very clear that there would be no savings, as such, in Fiscal Year 1971 or 1972.

It was pointed out, he said, that there would be long-term savings involved in the adoption of many of the recommendations in the report.

He also noted that since 1968, in terms of 1971 dollars, Defense spending has

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General Chapman Reports On Visit

Vietnamization Is 'Most Important' Accomplishment In Two Years

It's not possible to say when victory will come in the Republic of Vietnam, but "we'll get there if we have the courage to stick it out."

That is the view brought back to the U.S. by General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, July 26 after his sixth visit to Southeast Asia.

Asked what he meant by victory, General Chapman said, "it means a little country able to stand on its own two feet and take care of itself. In short, Vietnamization will be a fact. The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) will be able to take care of all military needs, the economy will stabilize, schools reopen, crops will flow to market and transportation improve."

General Chapman believes the enemy is in "deep difficulty" in I Corps, III and IV Corps, but still has the capability to launch heavy attacks in I Corps if he so chooses. He may try it, the commandant said, but the Marines guarding the northern provinces are ready for him.

General Chapman said mines and booby traps caused most Marine casualties and they do everything possible to avoid them. "There is no substitute for a Marine on the ground," the General observed.

He also pointed out that the Marine Corps strength in Vietnam is now down to less than half the number it was a year ago, and said three additional Marine units will be returned to Camp Pendleton, Calif., by October 15. There is no timetable for withdrawal of Marine units from I Corps.

General Chapman was impressed by the Cambodia operation

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Specialist Gives Advice On Income Tax Problems

Taxpayers—including those in uniform—welcome advice by income tax specialists. In a recent interview, such advice was given by Mr. J. O. Rolfson, a retired Supply Corps Commander, who now is a Navy tax specialist. He is an accountant and lawyer. He often has been a witness before Congressional Committees in connection with tax matters affecting Service personnel. Excerpts from the interview are given here:

Q.—Mr. Rolfson, based on your years of experience, what are some of the major problems servicemen have in filing state and local income tax returns?

A.—The main problem with state and local income tax returns involves the determination as to whether he is from an income tax state or from a state which does not have an income tax or one which exempts his military pay.

Usually he is far away from his home state. If he is from a state which has an income tax law and taxes military pay, he is not really in the home state, reading the home state and home town papers, so he is not up-to-date and current with the obligation for filing and paying.

As a result, he neglects to pay his income tax. He is not reminded daily by the home town papers.

There later comes a time when he wants to vote, or send his children to the home state university. At that time the state generally then finds that he is a domiciliary of that state, and perhaps should have been paying income taxes for these past years.

Naturally, he doesn't have the money to pay the penalties for years back, the accumulated taxes for many years, and the interest for many years back, and then he is facing a problem of: where am I going to educate my children?

As a practical matter, the only thing he can do in that case, unless the state will forgive him on the back income taxes, is to become a resident of whatever state he is serving in. And many do that.

I wish we could make it easier for the servicemen who come from states which have income tax laws, and which tax military pay, and we are making headway on it.

Q.—The Navy publishes a pamphlet which is designed to assist personnel in preparing income tax. Is this available to all the Services?

A.—Yes. This is the pamphlet called Federal Income Tax Information for Armed Forces Personnel. It's distributed widely by the Navy and Marine Corps. It's purchased by the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard and the Internal Revenue Service. It's available in all Internal Revenue Service offices.

I understand it is available in all Army and Air Force legal assistance offices. I know it is available in all Navy and Marine Corps offices.

It is designed to answer the questions which face servicemen most often. It is not designed to answer income tax questions generally. They are covered in other pamphlets.

Q.—How about a prisoner of war? I realize he is in a combat zone. What about his spouse or dependents? Are they liable for income tax as long as he is a POW?

A.—No, the wife is not liable for any return or payment of any income tax so long as her husband is serving in a combat zone or missing in action, or a prisoner of war from a combat zone.

Q.—In the military there are persons who spend possibly five or six or seven years overseas. These people do not under any circumstances maintain a residence in the United States. Why are these people subject to income tax from a state? They are not using the states for anything. Why would they be liable for income tax?

A.—Every person in the United States has a domicile—which is *domus legalis*—that is your legal home, and while serving with the Armed Forces you cannot gain a domicile in a foreign country.

Being a domiciliary of a state, that state can impose its income taxes upon you wherever you may be serving.

Q.—Take a person who has been overseas for five or six years. He has not used the facilities of any of the 50 states, and yet he has to pick a state and pay income tax.

A.—Well, if you are a legal resident of a state, and you have not abandoned that state in favor of another state, then that state can enforce its right to collect the income taxes by reason of your domiciliary affiliation.

This is what the state laws provide, and this is recognized and upheld as constitutional by the Federal courts.

Q.—In the near future, they are talking about giving the lower grades approximately as high as a 25 per cent raise. This is the lower enlisted grades. Why not exclude them from Federal income tax, rather than giving them a pay raise per se? Wouldn't this save the government money?

A.—They are already excluded by the new reform act of 1969. A married enlisted man with less than $3,500 income will find he owes no income tax this year. The single men with less than $1,750 will have no income tax. This is called the low income tax allowance.

If you look at the new withholding tables effective this year, you will find that most of the young men in the lower grades are having no income tax withheld, and at the end of the year they might not even have to file the returns in many cases. They will be pleasantly surprised to find they owe no income taxes.

Poverty regulations following HEW guidelines have been incorporated in the income tax laws. Right now we are revising this pamphlet to put out that information. We have much information to go out to the field, but we are not prepared yet. One thing is this low income tax allowance; others are the changes in withholding and reporting on moving expenses and allowances, and a few other factors.

As soon as we can see our way clear, all of us will put out notices. The legal assistance offices already have that information, however. You will find that the Department of the Army has put out a very fine bulletin on that. You might check with your nearest legal assistance officer.

Young Political Leaders Learn Of DOD-State Dept. Cooperation

The role of the Department of Defense in formulating and executing foreign policy, and the purpose of military forces and how they relate to foreign policy were discussed at a meeting of the American Council of Young Political Leaders in Washington, D.C., July 14. Representing DOD at the Department of State meeting were Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) G. Warren Nutter and Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee. Here are excerpts of their presentations.

Department Of Defense Effect On Foreign Policy

In discussing the role of the Department of Defense in formulating and executing foreign policy I think it is well to remind ourselves that, in the final analysis, decisions with respect to foreign policy are made by one man—the President of the United States . . . True, before he makes a major decision, the President consults his advisors, but when the time comes for choice, it is the President who decides what our policy shall be.

Assistant Secretary
G. Warren Nutter

You know, of course, that the Secretary of State is the principal advisor to the President on foreign policy matters. You know too that the National Security Council, consisting of the President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, was established by law in 1947 for the specific purpose of advising the President on policies relating to national security.

President Nixon has re-established the National Security Council as the principal forum for Presidential consideration of foreign policy issues. Consequently, it is through the National Security Council that the Department of Defense contributes to the formulation of foreign policy . . .

I'm sure you recognize that a discussion of whether the military establishment affects foreign policy, or foreign policy affects the military establishment, is very much a "chicken or the egg" proposition. Certainly the size, state of readiness, and deployment of our military forces are major factors in determining what foreign policy options are open to the President; on the other hand, commitments we have made to the security of our allies, as well as actual or potential threats to our vital interests abroad, certainly affect the decisions concerning our military requirements.

A parallel can be seen in the economic field. Because we are

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Purpose Of Military Forces Relating To Foreign Policy

Sometimes it is easy to forget that a foreign policy without the forces available to support it is no policy at all.

As we review the past 30 years of our history, we see three major wars—World War II, Korea, Vietnam and a series of lesser incidents—the Berlin blockade, Lebanon, Chinese offshore islands, the Dominican Republic, and the Cuban missile crisis. In each of these, our Armed Forces have been called upon to help maintain our foreign policy goal of a stable world environment, by opposing attempts to threaten our country or attempts to forcibly impose the will or ideology of one nation upon another.

A year ago President Nixon laid out a blueprint for our foreign policy in the Nixon Doctrine, which is dependent upon partnership, strength and negotiation. All three of these involve the Armed Services.

Secretary of Navy
John H. Chafee

In partnership we shall primarily rely upon the country we are associated with for necessary manpower but we shall under certain circumstances supply technical, financial and logistic assistance. For strength we are dependent both upon our general purpose forces and our strategic deterrent forces.

And armed strength also is essential to the third pillar of the Nixon Doctrine—negotiation. No meaningful concessions have ever been won from communist negotiators from a position of weakness.

It is obvious, of course, that neither the makers of foreign policy nor the defense forces can operate independently of each other in the pursuit of national goals. Day to day duties, responsibilities, and interests constantly converge, intermingle and overlap at every level.

At the highest level the key members of the National Security Council are the Secretaries of States and Defense. This

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Highlights Of Overseas Tour

Secretary Of State Cites Progress In Pacification, Vietnamization

At a mid-july press conference after an overseas tour, Secretary of State William P. Rogers covered the many avenues the Administration has followed in search of peace. The Secretary listed the paths by which an end to the Vietnam war can be attained. On his trip, Secretary Rogers headed the U.S. Delegation to the SEATO Conference in Manila, and met with officials in the Republic of Vietnam, Japan and Great Britain. Following are excerpts of the Secretary's press conference in Washington:

First, the SEATO meeting was successful; and there were two major developments, I would think. One, as you know, was the announcement by the new Government of the United Kingdom that their policies on Suez were changed and they would maintain a presence east of Suez.

The other, I think, successful development was that we had a good deal of discussion about the Nixon Doctrine, how it applied to different countries in the area and whether it would create problems—whether it was a manifestation of a neo-isolationism or whether it was what the President said it was. I think that I was able to reassure them that the Nixon Doctrine as announced in Guam, as implemented up to the present time and as it will be implemented in the future, is designed to merely reduce our military presence in some areas consistent with the realities, and not in any sense of the word is it a manifestation of a lack of resolve or an indication that there will be any lack of support for the obligations that we have assumed under our treaties.

Progress In Vietnam

In Vietnam itself, I was very encouraged by the developments in the last year—particularly in the field of pacification. I met with the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam. I visited

'The countryside is secure in many parts. Elections have been held in about 90 per cent of the villages and hamlets. And I think it is an encouraging fact that there has been progress in (pacification).'

General (Creighton) Abrams (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) in the hospital, spent an evening with General (William B.) Rosson, (Deputy Commander, MACV), spent a good deal of time one morning with some of the old hands among the correspondents and talked at considerable length to our Mission personnel (in Vietnam). And I think I could say that there was unanimity on the point that pacification had made great progress during the last year.

The countryside is secure in many parts. Elections have been held in about 90 per cent of the villages and hamlets. And I think it is an encouraging fact that there has been progress in that field.

Insofar as Cambodia is concerned, there seems to be no doubt about it that the incursion was a success . . .

I might add one other word. In the course of my discussions, we had a lot of time to deal with the topic of the future of Cambodia; and although we didn't make direct requests of any government, we did make it clear that we thought that the

'The more successful the Vietnamization program is, we believe, the greater the incentive will be for the enemy to negotiate, because otherwise he comes out empty-handed.'

Asian nations should help the present Government of Cambodia maintain its neutrality.

Q.—Mr. Secretary, while you were in London, you said, I believe both publicly and privately, that you thought the probable outcome of the conflict in South Vietnam would be a state of no war and no peace. In the light of your belief, what can you tell us about prospects for withdrawing all American forces?

A.—Well, . . . I did not say that that was my prediction. I did say that that is a possibility. It's a possibility that we've always recognized. The President's policy is a policy consisting of two parts. First is Vietnamization, which means that our troops will be replaced by the troops of South Vietnam. And we recognize that if we were not able to succeed in negotiating a settlement leading to peace that Vietnamization would have to proceed. And, as I say, I don't think anyone could observe the situation as it exists today in Vietnam without being encouraged by the progress that's been made.

Negotiations Our Goal

As to negotiations, we feel that there's a probability that somewhere along the line the other side will want to negotiate. The more successful the Vietnamization program is, we believe, the greater the incentive will be for the enemy to negotiate, because otherwise he comes out empty-handed. If he decides that the program is going to work and that he can get a fair

Secretary of State Rogers

deal in an election so that he'll have a proportionate representation, then he might decide to negotiate.

Q.—But if the Vietnamization program is proceeding so well and continuing on in the future, what incentive is there, or why should we want to negotiate?

A.—Well, because we believe in what we say. We mean it when we say that we would like to have the future of South

'. . . The South Vietnamese forces are quite strong now. They have well over a million men well-equipped, well-trained; and now they—at least, to some extent—have proven themselves in Cambodia. And they have a morale that didn't exist at all last year.'

Vietnam determined by the people of that country. And President Thieu is prepared to have an election, and we are prepared too. And the fact that the war is going as well as it seems to be going, the pacification program seems to be going as well as it's going, would not inhibit us at all from going ahead with the proposals we made to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Q.—Mr. Secretary, the President in his television conversation appearance spoke of the South Vietnamese being able to take care of their own security if there was a mutual withdrawal of outside forces. Does the Administration believe that it can't complete its Vietnamization process—that is, withdraw all American forces—until there is a political settlement?

Improved Forces

A.—No, I don't think that's the case. The President has never made any statement about our plans for withdrawal beyond next spring, and we don't intend to; but I do think that it's well to keep in mind that the South Vietnamese forces are quite strong now. They have well over a million men well-equipped, well-trained; and now they—at least, to some extent—have proven themselves in Cambodia. And they have a morale that didn't exist at all last year. And the total combined forces of

'I have always felt, and I still feel that there is a prospect, a reasonable prospect, that you can end this war by a negotiated settlement.'

the four Asian nations that are now cooperating together—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam—are about three times that of the North, and they have about three times the population. So we think it's quite possible that they can defend themselves against the common enemy.

De-Escalation

Q.—Mr. Secretary, I want to make sure that I understand what you said about whether and how the Cambodian operation has helped or hurt the prospects of negotiation. Am I correct in understanding that you believe that for a period of maybe a very few months—maybe two months—that it has diminished the prospects, but after that, you see an increased probability that Hanoi wants to negotiate?

A.—That's correct.

I have always felt, and I still feel that there is a prospect, a reasonable prospect, that you can end this war by a negotiated settlement.

On the other hand, if that is not the case, I think the Vietnamization program is going very well and I think the war, in effect, can end that way.

When I said, "No war and no peace," I mean you can have a situation where the country can operate successfully and it can build up industries, and still have terrorist attacks and things of that kind.

Already the war has de-escalated a great deal since last year. As a matter of fact, when I left Vietnam, that day there were only four enemy-initiated contacts and they were very light . . . So the war in South Vietnam really is diminished a good deal, and I would expect that if the Vietnamization program continues to work that will continue to be the case.

Vietnamization Is 'Most Important' Accomplishment In Two Years

General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Sergeant Major Joseph W. Dailey, Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, brief newsmen following their recent 13-day tour of Marine Corps units in Southeast Asia.

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—its effect and result. He said the enemy has based his operations on the sanctuary concept—rest, relaxation, training, regrouping and re-equipping. The U.S. and South Vietnamese operation upset this concept and "bought time" for South Vietnam.

The top military man in the Marine Corps looks for a quickening pace of events in South Vietnam, but thinks that a lot depends on what the enemy does during the next year. "We'll keep our powder dry," he said, "and meet withdrawals as they come," although there is no timetable for such withdrawals.

General Chapman believes the "most important" thing that has happened in Vietnam during the past 18-24 months is the progress of the Vietnamization program.

During a speech last March in Philadelphia, General Chapman described the Vietnamization program as he saw it:

"Last fall," he said, "the allied forces in Vietnam began a process called Vietnamization (a component of the President's program for peace). It was new, but it was the natural follow-on to the previous work of civic action, pacification and training.

"It was more than just turning over the war to the South Vietnamese so that we could get out. It meant building that nation up so that it could face a still determined enemy.

"Well, the process is working and our operational participation is ending. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is stronger, the Vietnamese economy is healthier, and the Armed Forces of that country are proving themselves every day on the battlefields as they take over more and more of the operational commitments."

Purpose Of Military Forces Relating To Foreign Policy

(Continued From Page Three)

interchange and cooperation extends throughout the two departments.

The Department of State incorporates a vital office concerned with political-military matters. Conversely, the Department of Defense has an equally important International Security Affairs Office which coordinates Pentagon relations with the State Department in the political-military area and evaluates the diplomatic ramifications of proposed military policies. For example, suppose hypothetically the Defense Department wishes to close a base overseas for financial reasons. It seems simple—just close the base. But think of the ramifications that must be considered and coordinated with the State Department. What about the timing of the U.S. departure? Defense forces of the other nation might have urgent need of the facility but be unable to afford it this year—yet if we get out now industry might take over the property and cause it to be lost as a military facility forever.

These are a few of the typical problems that arise and it is for these and similar reasons that an exchange program was inaugurated 10 years ago, whereby military officers work in State, and foreign service officers in the Department of Defense.

Major military commanders around the world have on their staffs civilian political advisors to assist them in their often considerable diplomatic roles.

The commanders of such large and effective military forces as our Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean must regularly devote a proportion of their time and energy to working with State Department officials on diplomatic matters, and the sailors of the Sixth Fleet are rightfully reminded that each one is to some extent an unofficial ambassador of the United States.

In summary, then, I believe you can easily see the importance of having a well-trained military establishment. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has made it clear that the goal of the Armed Forces of this nation is to help our nation keep peace, and only if that fails, to fight wars. This is the challenge of my job and of all jobs in the Defense Department—to supply the necessary ingredients to help keep peace in this uneasy world.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Department Of Defense Effect On Foreign Policy

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a wealthy nation we can do much to assist friendly nations and to inhibit the plans of potential enemies. Conversely, obligations we assume to help developing nations and to cooperate in trade with many nations, rich and poor, have their impact on our domestic economy. So, whether we are speaking of military forces, economic resources, or any other measure of national power, an effective foreign policy must be one that matches commitments to capabilities.

It is principally in this relating of commitments to capabilities that the Department of Defense contributes to the formulation of foreign policy. In addressing current problems, it is our responsibility to inform the President accurately of what is and what is not possible in a given situation.

In dealing with longer range problems, any commitments we undertake will place demands on our military establishment. We must see to it that the President knows, before a commitment is made, what portion of our national resources may be required to back that commitment. Ultimately, the President will make the decision. He must determine where our national interests are at stake and what commitments he can prudently make in support of those interests. The quality of the President's decisions will rest, however, on the quality of the information given to him as a basis for his decision-making.

. . . So far I have concentrated on our contribution to formulating policy. Let me turn now to the carrying out of policy. Of course the most obvious, yet least desirable way for the Department of Defense to implement foreign policy, is by applying military force or, in plain words, by fighting wars. War is the least desirable means of defending our vital interests but, unfortunately, the necessity of fighting wars has not yet been eliminated.

Fortunately, it is not always necessary to employ military force directly to secure our vital interests and carry out our foreign policy. Very often the fact that we are prepared for war is the surest guarantee of peace. And so the Department of Defense contributes to implementing foreign policy by organizing, training, equipping and deploying forces which are clearly capable of defending our vital interests and meeting our commitments to our allies.

Although "deterrence" is a term generally used with respect to nuclear war, the same principle can apply to any level of conflict. The combined strength of U.S. and allied conventional forces in Europe since the founding of NATO more than 20 years ago must certainly be given part of the credit for restraining Communist aggression. We need only look eastward to Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to see how Soviet leaders have employed their forces to carry out their policies against nations too weak to oppose them. I emphasize that it is combined U.S. and allied strength that deters Communist aggression.

I think this is vital—and I remind you that this is the central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine: The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but America cannot—and will not— conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.

CONGRATULATIONS—Mr. James C. Evans (left) is congratulated by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird after receiving the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. Mr. Evans, veteran Counsellor on Civil Rights to 10 Secretaries of Defense, was cited, "for distinguished service in the field of race relations in the Armed Forces and particularly with integration and advancements of Negro officers." He retired after 30 years' Federal civilian service.

The "Vietnamization" program, by which we assist the Vietnamese government to undertake a greater share of the combat and to meet the needs of its civilian population, is the best known manifestation of the Nixon Doctrine. But the doctrine is applicable on a worldwide basis, not only in Vietnam. Thus military assistance and sales programs are assuming new importance. They are the means for transferring to allied and friendly nations the military equipment and training they need to provide for their own and the common defense. In some areas where American forces are now stationed, we can increasingly realize substantial savings by exchanging military assistance for manpower. In other areas, we can help allies and friends to achieve a self-reliance that will make it unnecessary to use American manpower in future crises.

I think that by now you will have come to the conclusion that foreign policy and defense policy are really closely related. To summarize this close relationship of defense and foreign policy, let me quote President Nixon's foreign policy message. He said:

"We are for a world in which the importance of power is reduced; where peace is secure because the principal countries wish to maintain it. But this era is not yet here. We cannot entrust our future entirely to the self-restraint of countries that have not hesitated to use their power even against their allies."

DOD Officials Study Panel's Suggestions; Adoptions Underway

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been reduced by $17.1 billion. "At the same time," he said, "we've reordered our priorities and have increased non-defense spending by $18.3 billion."

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird in July 1969 and given "a very broad" charter to study the entire organization, structure and operation of the Department of Defense—but not questions of broad national policy within which the Defense Department operates. The Chairman of the Panel was Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman of the Board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Review Necessary

Reviewing the Panel's report, Secretary Laird said, "It was a review I thought was needed and necessary."

He recalled how, as a member of Congress, he was "very critical" of certain decisions and involvements which the United States had been drawn into worldwide. He put his views in the Defense Appropriation Bill of 1968. He said, "I pointed out that there was a need for an outside, independent group to look at the Defense Department in a critical fashion (and) to make a review of our organization and management techniques."

The Secretary of Defense continued:

"I felt it was needed and necessary since a review had not been made in the Defense Department organization and management techniques since 1958. I introduced legislation calling for a blue ribbon panel to look at the Department of Defense from a critical standpoint. Not only viewed by the Defense Department in-house, but a review by outsiders who could give a year of their time to look objectively at the Department of Defense."

Secretary Laird told how the Panel was made up of educators, business people and representatives from the ranks of labor who were willing to give up one year of their time to sit and study and think about the organization and management of the Defense Department.

Secretary Laird recalled how Chairman Fitzhugh had said: "This report does not deal with the things that are right with the Department of Defense . . . There are many things right with the Defense Department. This deals with the deficiencies in the Defense Department."

Correct Errors

It is important for all of us that are associated with the Defense family, Secretary Laird said, "to take this constructive criticism to heart and to try to do what we can to correct the errors that have been pointed out in this report."

He pointed out how the Defense Department had already gone forward with a major recommendation in the procurement field by initiating the new policy of "fly before you buy."

In another action, Secretary Laird issued orders July 29 to reappraise the equal opportunity program within the Defense Department and said he would increase his efforts to get black citizens in decision-making roles within the department.

The Secretary of Defense said, "we are also going to continue to assess this report and from time to time within the next few weeks we will be implementing the suggestions that are needed and necessary as rapidly as we can after proper consideration."

TALKS WITH FORMER VIET CONG—With the local province chief as interpreter, Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee (right) talks with former Viet Cong who have voluntarily returned to the South Vietnamese government. Conversation took place at a center for returnees near Tay Ninh in the Republic of Vietnam. Secretary Chafee was told that as a result of U.S. operations in Cambodia, this center has received more returnees in the past month than in all the previous year. Mr. Chafee returned to the U.S. in late June after a 10-day inspection tour.

NEW AFA SUPERINTENDENT — Lieutenant General Albert P. Clark has succeeded Lieutenant General Thomas S. Moorman as Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. General Clark was Commander of the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., since August 1968. General Moorman, Academy Superintendent for five years, has retired.

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